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1. Introduction 
 
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the determinants of firms’ organiza-
tional choices. In particular questions relating to cooperation among firms have been 
frequently analyzed. New models of economic exchange namely networks have been 
developed recently. Vertical networks as supply structures vary across industries and are 
distinct from vertically integrated firms and markets.  
By forming vertical collaboration structures, however, firms alter the competitive posi-
tion of several firms and in turn influence market structure and performance. This two-
way flow of influence is central in our analysis.  
 
Therefore the goal in this paper is to identify a trade-off between stability and profitabil-
ity possibly existing in vertical networks. We develop a model that captures demand 
uncertainty and separated markets. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief over-
view of related literature in order to motivate our approach. The model is presented in 
section 3. In section 4 we explore the optimal distribution of prices for an input good in 
buyer- seller networks. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper is a contribution to the literature of group formation and cooperation in oli-
gopolies. Questions of group formation and cooperation have long been in focus of eco-
nomic research especially in game theory. A central issue related to the more formal 
theory of group formation is the formulation of a proper coalition game which assigns 
cooperation rents to a given set of players and to every subset of players. A coalition 
game also specifies pay-off functions for every player and strategy. Stability and dimen-
sion of coalitions depending on different pay-off functions und cooperation rents are 
important aspects discussed in this context.
1 The described coalition approach analyses 
specific relationships between members of a coalition only indirect through the charac-
                                                 
1   See MYERSON (1977), BLOCH (1995) or for a survey WIESE (2005), BLOCH (1997).   -4-
teristic function.
2 In this setup symmetric relationships are implicitly assumed: every 
firm who is part of a coalition cooperates with every firm who is member of the same 
coalition. 
If we in turn allow for cooperative relationships that are nonexclusive, asymmetric 
structures of cooperation will be generated that are different from those studied in the 
coalition-formation literature. If there is cooperation between two firms we will call this 
relationship a “link”. A network can be defined as a set of firms related with a set of 
pair wise links between the firms.
3 In this context a star network is a structure of coop-
eration with a central firm directly linked to every firm while none of the other firms 
have a direct link with each other. To study concrete problems, industrial structures are 
often interpreted as networks in the sense above.
4 For example, recent years have wit-
nessed a large body of literature regarding to buyer-seller networks.
5 Questions respect-
ing to advantages of vertical networks in comparison to vertical integration and respect-
ing the influence of different economic scenarios on the formation and optimality of 
buyer-seller networks have been studied recently. Importance and economic conse-
quences of demand shocks in vertical buyer-seller networks have been an object of 
analysis too. 
KRANTON and MINEHART (2000) show that networks can yield greater social welfare 
when manufactures experience large idiosyncratic demand shocks. They also highlight 
comparative advantages of networks: capacity sharing and flexibility.
6 Therefore incen-
tives for the formation of vertical networks exist. 
The paper of KRANTON and MINEHART (2000) is a refinement of Piore and Sabel’s 
(1984) work on „flexible specialists”. Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that networks 
emerge in times of greater economic uncertainty.
7 In addition to different kinds of un-
                                                 
2   The characteristic function assigns to every subset S of the set of players N the payoff that can be 
realized through collaboration of the members of S independently from outside players N\S 
3   See JACKSON (2003) and VAN DEN NOUWELAND (2003) for a survey.   
4    For network models of special industrys see for example ECONOMIDES/ HIMMELBERG (1995), 
HENDRICKS/ PICCIONE/ TAN (1995), SMITH/ BACKERMAN/ RASSENTI (1996). 
5   For a more formal theory of buyer-seller networks see KRANTON/ MINEHART (2001) or HOLMSTRÖM/ 
ROBERTS (1998) for a survey. 
6   KRANTON/ MINEHART (2000) argue vertically integrated buyer that suffer large negative shocks 
regret having built costly unused productive capacity. In networks exists fewer units of productive 
capacity and buyers suffering the largest negative shock do not procure inputs. Inputs are allocated 
flexible to the buyers with the highest realisation of valuation for such an input. 
7   The connections between demand uncertainty and industry structure have also been in focus of ear-
lier papers. See for example BARON (1971); HOLTHAUSEN (1976).    -5-
certainty, the competitive environment of the network firms is in focus of some scien-
tific papers. GOYAL and MORAGA-GONZÁLEZ (2001) analyses the connection between 
competitive environment, incentives to invest in research und development (R&D) und 
the structure of the network.  
They show that in absence of rivalry between the network firms in separated markets 
the complete network
8 is stable, profit maximizing und socially optimal.
9 
In case of strong rivalry in a model of Cournot competition in a homogenous product 
market GOYAL and MORAGA-GONZÁLEZ (2001) show that the complete network is sta-
ble, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric network structures maxi-
mizes industry profits and welfare.
10 
 
This paper develops a framework to marriage the idea of (idiosyncratic) demand shocks 
with the consideration of the competitive environment of the firms in a buyer-seller 
network as a vertical industry structure. We will analyze a vertical star network. The 
upstream level consists of one seller. The downstream level consists of several buyers 
who can procure inputs from the upstream firm.  
The buyers operate in separated markets without the possibility of direct market interac-
tion. But there exist the possibility to interact indirectly through the bundling of demand 
for the input which is produced by the upstream firm. Bundling of the demand for in-
puts enables the upstream firm to realise economies of scale for the network from a col-
lective viewpoint.  
The demand of every downstream firm for the homogenous input determines the cost 
savings per unit and therefore the cooperation rent in the network.  
The figure below shows the described setup. 
                                                 
8   In complete networks there exists links between every member of the Network. 
9   See for more work on (R&D) networks in oligopol situations GOYAL/ JOSHI (1999) and LEAHY/ 
NEARY (1997). 
10   Especially they establish a trade off between the level of collaboration, the number of links in the 
network and the incentives to invest in research and development.    -6-
 
In this paper we assume zero-profits for the upstream firm. Therefore possible cost sav-
ings on the upstream level are completely redistributed to the downstream level.
11 In 
context of the literature above the upstream firm can be interpreted as a joint project of 
the downstream firms with the goal to reduce marginal cost of input production. Al-
ready without demand uncertainty questions regarding proper distributions of the coop-
eration rent in shape of cost savings arise. Each downstream firm face oligopolistic 
competition but its market is separated from the other downstream firms of the network. 
Demand for input which could be produced by the upstream firm is a function of the 
market success of the downstream firms in the network. Idiosyncratic demand shocks 
influence downstream markets randomly. Therefore demand for inputs possibly pro-
duced by the upstream firm is random too.  
 
Is there a set of stable divisions of the cost savings? Can we identify divisions that firms 
would agree with ex ante? How should cost savings been allocated from a collective 
point of view? 
In case of some downstream firms experience positive demand shocks while other 
downstream firms experience negative demand shocks or no demand shocks asymmet-
ric demand for inputs arises in the network. In consequence asymmetric contributions to 
the realized economies of scale in shape of cost savings on the upstream level arise too. 
Should cost saving be allocated asymmetric in this situation from a network perspec-
tive? 
                                                 
11   Therefore problems of incomplete contracts are not in focus in this paper.  
upstream 
downstream  downstream  downstream   -7-
Should we strengthen differences in the network or should we balance between the 
asymmetric downstream markets with proper divisions of the cost savings? These ques-




3.1 Downstream profits without demand shocks 
 
We consider a duopoly model with price competition and a given degree of product 
differentiation to model the  { } 1,..., Nn =  markets on the downstream level. In order to 
allow for price competition with the possibility of heterogeneity among firms and prof-
its, a model of spatial competition called “linear city” is used.
12 The city consists of a 
street of length 1. There exist two firms and they sell their output on a single market and 
compete in prices (Bertrand-competition). We assume separated downstream markets. 
Therefore every firm on the downstream level face this setup and the competitor of 
every firm is not member of the network. 
Consumers live along the street and are uniformly distributed with the densityω .
13 Each 
consumer wants to buy exactly one unit of the good or nothing at all, if the price ex-
ceeds his surplus from consumptionυ
+ ∈\ . Individuals only differ in taste specified by 
the spot, where die individual is situated which is labelled by  , 0 1 qq ≤ ≤ . Consumer q 
buys at firm 1 if the total costs are lower than if buying at firm 2 and total expenses do 
not exceed his valuation υ  for the good.  
For every price combination  1 p  and   2 p  we can find the consumer who is just indiffer-
ent from which store to buy. The marginal consumer is denoted by  () 12 ˆˆ , qq p p = . He is 
located at the point where his total costs that include price und transportation costs are 
equal irrespectively of where he buys the good such that  ( )( ) 12 ˆˆ 1 T qp T qp δδ + =− +  
holds, where  [ ] 0 :0 , 1 T
+ → \ ,  ( ) q T q 6 ,  ( ) 00 T = , 0' T < ,  0 q ∀ ≠ , 0' ' T ≤  is the common 
transportation cost function;  [ ] 0,1 δ ∈  denotes a parameter that captures the degree of 
                                                 
12   The first model of spatial competition is attributed to LAUNHARDT (1885). 
13   Thus the total number of consumers is equal toω .   -8-
differentiation in the market.
14  j p , { } 1,2 j∈  is the price to be paid for the good chosen 
from firm 1 and firm 2. The marginal consumer is important to derive the two firm’s 
market demand functions: All consumers located to the left of  ˆ q buy from firm 1 and 
all consumers located to the right of the marginal consumer buy from firm 2. Assume 
that the maximum willingness to pay υ  is high enough that every individual buys in 
equilibrium. Recall that this setup holds for all of the N downstream markets. Therefore 
all firms at the downstream level face oligopolistic price competition with a given de-
gree of product differentiation. 
 
Remark 3.1 (Shape of demand functions): If both companies serve some customers, 
the demand functions are strictly decreasing in the own and strictly increasing in the 
competitor’s price. A priori it is impossible to identify the sign of their second deriva-
tives. It is determined by the second and third derivatives of to transportation cost func-
tion. Note that a linear or quadratic transportation cost function implies that the de-
mand functions are linearly decreasing (increasing) in the own (competitor’s) price and 
consequently the second derivatives of the demand functions vanish: 
{}
2






∂∂ =∈ : 
 
Proof: An increase in the own price leads to a lower market share (and vice versa for a 
price increase of the competitor): 
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∂∂ =∈  if T′′  is constant (which is the case if T is linear or quadratic). 
The same holds for firm 2. 
                                                 
14   For  1 δ = the model can be interpreted as second stage of a Hotelling model with endogenous product 
choice that leads to maximal differentation see HOTELLING (1929), D’ASPREMONT et al. (1979).   -9-
To derive demand, prices and profits in equilibrium, costs of production on the down-
stream level have to be specified. We assume the only costs occurring are expenses to 
produce or procure the input good. We further assume an relation of complementarily of 
1:1 between the input good und the output that is sold on the market. In case of own 
input production only fix costs in shape of F
+ ∈\  arise. Procurement of the input good 
on (network) extern markets causes costs per unit denoted by  M p
+ ∈\ . Alternatively 
downstream firm i can procure the input from the (network) upstream firm with 
u
i p
+ ∈\ per unit. Therefore the shape of marginal costs  i c of downstream firm i is char-
acterized as follows: 
 
0        own production of the input 
:      procurement on (network) extern markets 













The demand for input is a derivative of the market model described above. Average 
costs in case of own production of the input good are there-
fore () () :0 , ;  :
i
F
ii q kq k q
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M i q p q ≥∀  holds. The condition implies that downstream firms, in comparison to pro-
curement on (network) extern markets, are always better off with the own production of 
the input. 
In this paper the frequently used examples of linear and quadratic transportation costs 
are applied to prove the existence of several results. 
 
Example 3.1 (linear and quadratic transportation costs): Assume that the transporta-
tion cost function is linear or quadratic  ( )
2 : Tq q q α βγ =+ +  the marginal consumer, de-
mand and profits for the downstream firms is given with  0 F = ⇔ 0 i c >   { } 1,2 ij ≠∈  
{ } , ql dd d ∈ :  quadratic:  0, ,  0 α βγ ≤< ,  : q d β γ = + , ; linear: 0, λ ≤   0, β <    0 γ = , 
: l d β = ,  
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Proposition 3.1 (Comparative statics): If transportation costs are from quadratic type 
we can identify the following marginal effects: 
 
22 2
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3.2 Downstream profits with demand shocks 
 
Market demand in the  { } 1,..., Nn =  downstream markets has a random size ii ω ωε =+  , 
where  i ε   is an idiosyncratic shock. The shocks change the density ω  of consumers in 
the setup described in 3.1.
16 Assume the shocks are identically and independently dis-
tributed with mean zero []0 i E ε =  . Therefore the random size of the i-th downstream 
market is identically and independently distributed with mean ω  or  [] i E ω ω =   respec-
tively. This approach is in contrast to the model established in KRANTON and MINEHART 
(2000). In absence of market environment they assume each buyer has a random valua-
tion for such an input in a buyer-seller network. Therefore manufactures face idiosyn-
cratic shocks
17 to their demand for inputs. 
 
Example 3.2 (demand shocks): Assume the existence of idiosyncratic demand shocks 
and that the transportation cost function is linear or quadratic. For the marginal con-
sumer, the demand of each firm, prices and profits holds:  ( )
2 : Tq q q α βγ =+ + ; 
: q d β γ =+, 0, α β ≤ , 0 γ < ;   : l d β = ,0,  0,  0 α βγ ≤ <= ; { } 1,2 ij ≠∈ ;  { } , ql dd d ∈ : 
                                                 
16   Therefore shocks can be interpreted as random variations of the sum of consumers in the N down-
stream markets. 
17   In addition they assume aggregate shocks on the willingness to pay.   -11-
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It can be easily checked that comparative static’s are the same as in the case without 
demand shocks. Up to now the model ignores the possibility of different costs situations 
faced by the firms in consequence of varying demands. Perhaps in case of positive de-
mand shocks inputs can be produced or procured suffering lower costs per unit. Beyond 
the effect concerning both competitors, perhaps the participation in a vertical network 
can establish comparative cost advantages for a member of the network. Therefore next 
section is to specify cost functions explicitly. 
 
3.3 Demand and costs for upstream firms 
 
Procurement of the input from the (network) upstream firm causes fix costs F
+ ∈\  
faced by the upstream firm.
18 The upstream firm is able to produce the input good for 
several downstream firms bundled. Therefore the average production costs per unit in-
put good are in shape of  ( ) :0 , ;
U K
+ ∞→ \ ( ):
U F
















=∈ ∑  is the sum of demand for the input good from the N down-
stream firms derived from their individual (and separated) market situation. With this 
specification for all downstream firms it is implicitly assumed either the whole demand 
for input is passed to the upstream or zero units are passed.
19 For the upstream firm the 
zero-profit condition holds. Therefore all cost savings in shape of scale effects are given 
back to the downstream level. In the symmetric case 
uu F
ii jj Q cp pc = == =for all down-
stream firms holds. 
                                                 
18   In this framework fix costs can be widely interpreted. Examples are economies of scale or innovation 
technologies. The assumption of a convex innovation technology is in line with the approach of 
D’ASPREMONT/ JACQUEMIN (1988) and TIROLE (1992). Both papers assume increasing costs for the 
accumulation of further units of experience. Therefore the accumulated stock of experience is convex 
in investments in research and development. 
19   Otherwise duplication of fix costs on up- and downstream level occurs.    -12-




In this section we analyze the optimal distribution of realized economies of scales on 
the upstream level in case of bundling the demand for the input good. Recall that for the 
upstream level the zero-profit condition holds and therefore all cost savings have to be 
assigned to the downstream firms. Our purpose is to highlight the optimal pattern of 
constant prices for the input good that have to be paid by the downstream firms. The 
examples of chapter 3.2 imply that the profits of the N downstream firms are increasing 
in the market demand. For this reason we explore if it’s possible to increase (aggre-
gated) market demand (and therefore to increase aggregated profits) from a network 
perspective through a proper allocation of input prices to the N downstream firms. For 
simplicity and clearness we investigate and illustrate this important question for linear 
transportation costs  () : T qq α β =+  in a symmetric setting.
20  
 
Consider two downstream firms i,j that faces Bertrand competition in separated markets 
as modelled above. Assume both markets are completely identical ex ante. In particular 
prices for the input good and market prices, demands and profits are the same in equi-
librium. Now assume the i-th downstream market is affected by a (positive) demand 
shock ( ) ω ε +  and simultaneously the total number of consumers in the j-th downstream 
market is unchanged ω . 
 
Remark 4.1: The positive demand shock in the i-th downstream market increases ag-
gregated demand  ij qqq =+ and aggregated profits  ij π ππ = +  from a network per-
spective. Constant input prices independently from the (positive) demand shock yield 
positive profits for the upstream firm 0 U π > : 
 
                                                 
20   The results also emerge for quadratic transportation costs and can be shown for weaker assumptions 
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When in turn the zero-profit condition holds for the upstream firm, decreasing input 
prices for at least one downstream firm is an easy implication of positive demand 
shocks in our setup. In consequence the profit for all intramarginal unit increases. Fur-
thermore additional demand can be served of at least one downstream firm in duopolis-
tic price competition due to the better cost position. How should we design the input 
prices? Is it possible to increase the profit from network perspective with an additional 
asymmetric cost shock in presence of a demand shock?  
Intuitively, one could recommend making the downstream firm i (with lager market 
demand due to a positive demand shock) better off at the expense of the downstream 
firm j with a market demand comparatively smaller. The reason could be seen in the 
more valuable market shares of downstream firm i. If this is true an optimal cost differ-
entiation depending on different market demands would exist. Our results below show 
that this intuition does not hold in presence of the zero-profit condition for the upstream 
firm. Questioning optimal cost differentiation does not require explicit consideration of 
the height of the economies of scale on the upstream level changed due to demand 
shocks.  
For simplicity assume identical marginal costs of the competitors in both markets i,j 
after the demand shock such that  12 0
uu
ij cc p p = ==>  holds for downstream markets i,j. 
,
UU
ij p p  denote the prices for the input good in the downstream markets i,j needed to 
guarantee zero-profits on the upstream level. Now assume downstream firm i (affected 
by a positive demand shock) get a cost reduction of  1 λ  what  11
iU
i cpλ = −  implies. To 
ensure zero-profits on the upstream level downstream firm j has to incur additional costs 
of  2 λ  such that  12
jU
j cpλ = +  holds. 
   -14-
Proposition 4.1 (1): Asymmetric costs  11
iU
i cpλ = − ;  12
jU
j cpλ = +  for downstream firms 
increase demand and profits from network perspective if and only if  21 1
ε
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Note that it’s possible to increase aggregated profits through cost reallocation if constel-
lation of parameters  ( ) 21 1 ε
ω λλ <+  does not harm the zero-profit condition for the up-
stream firm. 
 
Proposition 4.1 (2):  If  the zero-profit condition on the upstream level holds it is im-
possible to increase demand and profits from network perspective through cost reallo-
cation.  
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λλ λ δ λ δ λ
ω
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ ⋅+ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ( ) 21 1 ε
ω λλ ⇒> +
22 
 
Note that in case of linear or quadratic transportation costs asymmetric cost allocations 
don’t maximize profits from network perspective in a vertical star network. If we make 
a downstream firm better off through cost reduction of  1 λ  this cost advantage also holds 
for all intramarginal units. Due to the (positive) demand shock in downstream market i 
                                                 
21   Without demand shocks  21 λ λ <  holds. 
22   Without demand shocks  21 λ λ >  holds.   -15-
2 λ  hold for comparatively fewer units. We therefore have to establish additional costs in 
shape of  2 λ  such that  21 λ λ >  holds to satisfy the zero-profit condition on the upstream 
level. The gain of demand in market i is overcompensated through the loss of demand in 
market j. Therefore in presence of asymmetric prices for the input good, demand and 
profit decreases from network perspective. The figure below shows that this result arises 
also for  0 ε = .  
 
 
Decreasing procurement costs in market i cause losses for the upstream firm for all in-
tramarginal units of the input good demanded by downstream firm i before cost reduc-
tion. This is illustrated by the area ABOH. In consequence of the lower procurement 
costs downstream firm i chooses a lower optimal price and serves therefore additional 
demand  ˆˆ MiM i qq ′ − .
23 Establishment of additional costs for the input good in market j 
such that  21 λ λ =  holds implies a decline of served market demand  ˆˆ MjM j qq ′ −  by down-
stream firm j. Although changes in demand compensate each other the upstream firm 
incurs losses illustrated by the area BEFO. This harms the zero-profit condition for the 
upstream firm. Additional revenues in market j expressed by area DJPU are lower than 
missing revenues in market i represented by area AEFH. Therefore the condition of 
proposition 4.1 (1) can not be satisfied. In the next section we explore implications of 
demand shocks on negotiations about prices of inputs between the downstream firms in 
presence of the upstream zero-profit condition. We also discuss the relation of our re-
sults to the propositions stated above. 
 
                                                 
23   See for a more general proof remark 3.1. 
Cost reduction in market i    Additional costs in market j 
( ) 1 pT q δ +
1 p 2 p
ˆ
Mj q ˆ′ Mj q
( ) 2 1 pTq δ +−  
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2 p
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( ) 1 pT q δ +  








0  1   -16-
4.2 Nash Bargaining 
 
In presence of (idiosyncratic) demand shocks the contribution of the N downstream 
firms to the economies of scale realized during production of the input good on the up-
stream level and gained through bundling demand for the input good differs. Assume 
that the downstream firms negotiate about the division of realized cost savings and the 
procurement prices for inputs respectively. Possible outcomes of this negotiations and 
the correspondence to the efficiency results derived in chapter 4.1 arise as important 
questions. Therefore we analyze a n-person bargaining game with the player set 
{ } 1,..., Nn =  consisting of the downstream firms. Among the various options to model
24 
this situation we only consider a simple bargaining model where n players play for the 
NASH cooperative bargaining solution in the multilateral case.
25 First of all we have to 
determine cooperation surplus and individual outside options of the N firms on the 
downstream level.  
The rent to be divided  [ ) 0 :0 , R
+ ∞→ \ ;  ( ) QR Q 6 can be calculated as the difference be-
tween the market price for the input good and the average costs occurring on the up-
stream level in case of producing the input good bundled. Furthermore this difference is 
multiplied by the aggregated market demand from network perspective to determine 










RQ p QQ qq q
Q =
⎛⎞
=− ⋅ = = ⎜⎟











Note that in our setup a downstream firm is able to procure input goods by own produc-
tion. Therefore in case of no cooperation the outside option  [ ) 0 :0 , i A
+ ∞→ \ ;  () ii i qA q 6  
of the i-th downstream firm can be calculated as difference between market price for the 
input good and the average costs of own production: 
 
                                                 
24   See for other revenue rules, in particular for the shapely value WIESE (2005) and HOLLER/ ILLING 
(1993).  
25   See for example HOLLER (1992).   -17-
() :    with    ii M i
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In this paper  ,  i iN θ ∈  denote the share of the downstream firm i of R. The common 
approach of maximizing the NASH-product under constraints leads to the shares  i θ  on 


































It is easily checked that in absence and in case of identical outside options the coopera-
tion surplus is divided completely symmetric. Demand shocks as introduced in section 
3.2 in turn lead to different market demands  i q  and therefore heterogeneous alternatives 
or outside options respectively. Note that in this situation downstream firm i get the sum 
of the n-th share of the cooperation surplus und the n-th share of the aggregated differ-
ences to the outside options of the other downstream firms. Therefore the Nash-solution 
makes parties better off with comparatively valuable alternatives.
26 In our model down-
stream firms realizing the highest positive (idiosyncratic) demand shocks dispose of 
relatively valuable outside options.
27 
 
Negotiated shares of R now can calculated as individual input prices per unit 
u
i p  that 
have to be paid by the N downstream firms respectively. Calculation has to take into 























                                                 
26    Therefore parties with comparatively less valuable alternatives receive less then the n-th share of 
cooperation surplus. 
27   For reasons of clearness this derivation does not consider that parties calculate cooperation surplus 
and outside options in anticipation of the result of the bargaining game. Therefore no perfect fore-
sight on the implications of bargaining results in particular on costs, prices und resulting demand is 
assumed. This is in contrast with the strong assumptions of rationality and information relating to the 
Nash-solution.    -18-
 
Proposition 4.2 (1) (Comparative static’s): Assume that downstream firm i disposes of 
a complementarily valuable outside option in consequence of idiosyncratic demand 
shocks. The n-person Nash bargaining game ensures downstream firm i a complemen-
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Note that this asymmetric distribution of procurement costs among the downstream 
firms is in contrast to the efficiency results of chapter 4.1. In particular the outcome of 




Proposition 4.2 (2) (stability): The NASH cooperative bargaining solution in the multi-
lateral case implies stability of the network. The network is stable independently from 
concrete realisation of the idiosyncratic demand shocks. Firms can never be better off 
with own production for example in case of positive demand shocks.  
  
Proof (per contradiction): Assume that downstream firm i is better off due own pro-
duction of the input good which implies the existence of a  i q  such that 
i
u F
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holds. Finally this leads to  () 01 nF >−  what contradicts with F
+ ∈\ .  
                                                 
28   In particular it would be possible to over compensate firms which are worse of in comparison to the 
Nash bargaining solution through side payments.  
29   We assume symmetry for the other firms.     -19-
 
The result is very intuitive because if Nash solution is applied the parties with compara-
tively valuable outside options can not attain the aggregated differences to the outside 
options of the other downstream firms. Therefore all parties profits from positive reali-
zations of idiosyncratic demand shocks. In case of negative realizations of idiosyncratic 
demand shock all downstream firms’ profits from bundling the demand for the input 
good. From proposition 4.1 (1) together with proposition 4.2 (2) follows directly theo-
rem 4.2: 
 
Theorem 4.2: In case of idiosyncratic demand shocks negotiations on the prices for the 
input good leads to a stable but inefficient (complete) network.
30 
 
Seen together, the results obtained for a vertical star network as defined above yield a 
number of observations.  
First we note that firms generally have an incentive to collaborate in shape of bundling 
the demand for an input good, so the empty network is never incentive compatible.  
Second, (idiosyncratic) demand shocks lead to an asymmetric distribution of bargaining 
power in the negotiations for input prices between the downstream firms.  
Third, this difference in firms outside options does not threat the stability of the network 
but has negative consequences for efficiency from network perspective. Individual con-
siderations lead firms to a distribution of input prices that does not maximize aggregated 
profits.  
This problem becomes more relevant if the strong assumptions 
i
F
M q p ≤  and Nash-
cooperative bargaining solution are softened. Then it could feasibly happen that in pres-
ence of strong demand shocks the bargaining solution leads to instability of the net-
work.
31 In the next section we briefly discuss some possibilities to soften or solve this 
kind of problems. 
 
 
                                                 
30   Recall the assumption that maximum willingness to pay υ
+ ∈\  is high enough that every individual 
buys in equilibrium in the N downstream markets. Therefore we don’t analyze questions relating to 
overall social welfare.  
31   See ROTEMBERG/ SALONER (1986) for the possibility of deviation from cooperation and collusion in 
consequence of large positive demand shocks modelled in a Bertrand setup.   -20-
4.3 Additional comments 
 
In our approach efficiency problems of the Nash cooperative bargaining solution arise 
because downstream firms realizing comparatively large positive demand shocks 
doesn’t internalise the external effect of their strong bargaining power due valuable out-
side options. In particular they don’t consider demand effects of higher input prices for 
downstream firms confronted by a lower density of consumers. In consequence ineffi-
ciencies arise from network perspective. Therefore solution concepts have to take into 
consideration possibilities of internalising these extern effects. On the one hand we 
could establish a system of side payments inspired by tax and transfer systems. In gen-
eral it has to be guaranteed that values of the alternatives equate each other after realiza-
tion of the demand shocks. 
Starting from the ex ante expected market demand ω  additional demand could be taxed 
per unit. This implies increasing procurement costs of the input good for all units ex-
ceeding expected market demand ω . These tax revenues can be used to subsidize the 
weaker downstream parties until the outside options equate each other. Note that the 
expected realization of the demand shock is zero for all firms from ex ante perspective. 
Therefore all downstream firms would agree with these non linear prices ex ante. In this 
case the question arises how strong are incentives to deviate from ex ante agreement and 
to renegotiate the input prices ex post. This question becomes much more interesting if 
we generalize our setup. In our paper the ex ante agreement is renegotiation proof be-
cause in case of cooperation all downstream firms reach at least the same costs that 
would occur in case of own production which in turn are never higher then network 
extern market prices for the input good. If the downstream firms are not able to write 
complete conditional contracts from ex ante perspective perhaps a proper structure of 
control- and governance mechanisms can be implemented to soften the described prob-
lem of externalities. However these possibilities have to be analyzed carefully. For ex-
ample the vertical control problem inherent in delegation is essentially that of double 
marginalization of rents. Furthermore establishment of a governance structure regularly 
implies that the zero-profit condition and the implicit assumed productive efficiency on   -21-
upstream level vanishes. Therefore additional questions related to problems of delega-




5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our goal in this paper was to explore the existence of a trade-off between profitability 
and stability in vertical networks in presence of demand uncertainty. For the chosen 
setup we showed bargaining on cooperation surplus leads to inefficient allocations from 
network perspective. In case of weaker assumptions with respect to the outside option 
or other revenue rules stability of cooperation and network is expected to be endan-
gered. Some solution concepts are shortly introduced and discussed in the section 
above. Our results may suggest at least two avenues for future research. First, to analyze 
proper governance structures of vertical networks the relation of this paper to the litera-
ture of incomplete contracts in particular to the literature of the theory of the firm has to 
be investigated carefully. Secondly, implications of heterogeneity among firms in verti-
cal networks could be studied from a more practical point.  
Varying demand among the downstream firms could be the result of different business 
strategies. In this case heterogeneity would be endogenous and incentive mechanisms 
could be studied from network perspective. 
                                                 
32   See for an overview of problems in hierarchical structures of production MOOKHERJEE (2006).    -22-
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